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Abstract 
The article analyzes the impact of the globalization of markets, technologies and companies 
and of the Europeanization of public policies on state capacities in technology policy. Based 
on empirical examples from the field of information technology, the article argues that 
technology policy has been characterized by two contradictory developments in the last two 
decades. On the one hand, the concepts and strategies guiding public policies have become 
more and more complex, resulting in comprehensive programs for national and European 
„innovation policies“. On the other hand, as a result of the economic globalization; as well as 
of changes in the internal structure of the state, the state capacities to implement these 
ambitious strategies successfully have been eroding. As a consequence, technology policy 
both on the national and on the supranational level has been confronted with an intensifying 
strategic dilemma. Finally, the article discusses policy options to cope with this strategic 
dilemma in innovation policy. 
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1. Economic Globalization and National  
Technology Policy 
For decades, the public support of scientific and technological innovations has been 
regarded as being one of the major functions of the modern welfare state. The pursuit of 
“national interests” and the international competition between states and between companies 
have guided the establishment and the expansion of national research capacity, and have 
shaped the development of modern technologies – for both civilian and for military purposes. 
The globalization of companies, markets and technologies, however, has significantly 
affected this role of the nation state and its capacity to act in technology policy. 
The challenges which confront the nation state in technology policy at the turn of the century 
are highly ambiguous. On the one hand, since the late 1980s a rapidly expanding number of 
authors has argued that, in the process of globalization, both the importance of technology 
for the public welfare of modern democracies and of the nation state as a promoter of 
technological advances and of industrial competitiveness have been increasing (see e.g. 
Brandin, Harrison, 1987; Porter, 1990; Stopford, Strange, 1991; Tyson, 1992; Thurow, 1992; 
Luttwak, 1993). According to the new “logic of technology wars”, states are no longer 
competing for power over more territory, rather they are competing for the means to create 
wealth within their territory (cf. Stopford, Strange 1991, p. 1). And “technology, because it 
affects standards of living and wealth and because it is the source of the superweapons of 
the future, is the new area of competition. But it is not the traditional competition of 
capitalism. This conflict is more sophisticated than the competition found in most of the 
existing political and economic systems. Only the most clever and enduring competitors will 
be rewarded in the arena. Those that prevail in this war will control the resources of the 
world; they will control their Lebensraum; they will be the next global powers” (Brandin, 
Harrison, 1987, p. V). 
On the other hand, there are frequent claims that, due to the globalization of companies, 
markets and technologies, the very capacity of the nation state to promote and to control the 
creation, distribution and utilization of advanced technologies has been declining (Ohmae, 
1990; Camilleri, Falk, 1992; OECD, 1992; OECD, 1999; Muldur, Petrella, 1994; Gerybadze 
et al., 1997). Most important in this respect is the growing asymmetry between the limited, 
territorially-based scope of the state’s jurisdiction and the global, borderless range of action 
of companies. According to the “logic of global capitalism”, the notion of a “national interest” 
has lost its significance: “The global economy follows its own logic and develops its own web 
of interest, which rarely duplicate the historical borders between nations. As a result, national 
interest as an economic, as opposed to a political, reality has lost much of its meaning” 
(Ohmae, 1990, p. 183) – and, one could add, states have lost most of their functions in 
technology policy. 
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Against this background, it is the purpose of the following article to give an empirical account 
of the development of state capacity in German and European information technology. 
Based on a concept of state capacity derived from neo-institutionalist policy analysis 
(Section 2), the article first looks at the development of national state capacity in the German 
IT sector (Section 3). The results indicate that there has been a significant decline in national 
state capacity to influence this sector. The crucial question addressed in the second part of 
this article (Sections 4 and 5) then, is whether the transfer of policies from the national to the 
European level has compensated for this loss of national state capacity. Has it been possible 
to “bring the state back in” within a more complex institutional architecture, thus 
strengthening Europe in the global technology race? Or has the Europeanization of 
technology policy reinforced the erosion of state capacity in Europe? 
2. State Capacity in Technology Policy –  
A Neo-Institutionalist Approach 
Any attempt to identify the capability of public actors to reach their strategic goals in a 
distinct policy field, such as technology policy, is confronted with the problem of finding an 
appropriate concept of “state capacity” which could be employed in empirical research. This 
is not to say that a grand theory of “The State” is needed in the first place. As historical and 
comparative institutionalist research has shown, “possibilities for state interventions of given 
types cannot be derived from some overall level of generalized capacity or ‘state strength’” 
(Evans et al., 1985b, p. 353). But state capacity is not simply the sum of the state’s legal 
competencies and of its financial, human and military resources either (on the various 
concepts of “state capacity”, see Weiss, 1998, pp. 14–40). According to neo-institutionalist 
policy analysis, policy outcomes can be interpreted as the composite effect of a large variety 
of  institutional variables, i.e. institutions are the main explanatory variable. In contrast to 
older concepts of institutionalism, neo-institutionalist policy-analysis is guided by a much 
broader understanding of institutions. The neo-institutionalist concept includes “both formal 
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” (Thelen, Steinmo, 
1992, p. 2); and, in addition, this concept goes beyond the realm of public actors and 
organizations, including private actors and organizations as well. Based on this broader 
concept of institutions, neo-institutionalist policy research has identified a number of 
“institutional” variables which can be instrumental in explaining policy outcomes and which, 
in sum, can contribute to a state’s capacity in a particular policy field (Zysman, 1983; Evans 
et al., 1985a; Hall, 1986; Scharpf, 1987; Steinmo et al., 1992; Weaver, Rockman, 1993; 
Mayntz, Scharpf, 1995; Hall, Taylor, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Among these variables are the rules 
of electoral competition; the structure of party systems; the organization of government and 
the relations among its various branches and levels; the governance of markets; and, the 
structure and organization of economic actors such as companies, business organizations 
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and trade unions. Most important for the purpose of this article are the following three sets of 
variables: 
- first, the state’s internal structure and its resources, e.g. the horizontal and vertical 
division of power, and the norms, rules and habits guiding the behavior of politicians 
and public officials; 
- secondly, the internal organization of the relevant societal sub-sectors, e.g. the 
governance of markets, the  organization of an industry and the internal resources of 
companies; 
- thirdly, state-society relations, i.e. the (formal and informal) relations between the state 
and the actors and organizations in the relevant societal sub-sectors, e.g. the inter-
organizational relations between government departments and companies. 
In this analytical perspective, state capacity is the product of a complex configuration of 
public and private actor constellations with their respective interests, strategies and 
resources. First of all, the success of public policies depends on the state’s capability to 
strategically provide and allocate resources. Without adequate institutional capacity, 
appropriate policy instruments, or a certain degree of strategic coherence, governments 
would certainly not be able to influence the activities of companies or research laboratories. 
However, even the most generous and well-administered public program would miss its 
target if the companies ignore it or if they only use public money to replace internal funds 
which are already available. Hence, the success of industry-related public R&D policies also 
depends on the structural opportunities and restrictions the companies offer, i.e. their 
competitive environment, their strategies, their internal organization, etc. Moreover, 
successful policies are often based on close and stable relations between public actors and 
companies. Without such links and without the trust developed within these networks, the 
government lacks sufficient knowledge about possible and necessary interventions which 
can easily result in the exploitation of its activities through opportunistic behavior by the 
companies. 
In the perspective of a neo-institutionalist state theory, the approach outlined here is broader 
than the neo-Weberian approach as emphasized, for example, by Theda Skocpol and others 
(Evans et al., 1985a). Rather, it builds upon Peter Katzenstein’s concept of a “policy network” 
as presented in “Between Power and Plenty” (Katzenstein, 1978), and the institutionalist 
approach advanced by Peter Hall in his book “Governing the Economy” (Hall, 1986). In the 
perspective of empirical policy research, the approach employed in this article combines the 
usual “top-down” approach with a “bottom-up” analysis, as suggested by Paul Sabatier 
(1986). 
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3. The German State and the IT Industry 
For a better understanding of some of the recent problems in European technology policy, 
historical comparisons with German technology policy in the 1970s and 1980s can be highly 
instructive. Both the German state and the German research system show some features 
which also characterize the institutional architecture of European technology policy (Reger, 
Kuhlmann, 1995). In regard to German technology policy, it is important to emphasize four 
basic characteristics: 
- first, the German state is highly fragmented. The organization of the national 
government gives its various branches a high degree of autonomy and, in addition, the 
national government has to share considerable powers with the federal states (Länder). 
In technology policy, the national government commands the largest budget. This is 
indicated, for example, by the distribution of public expenditures for R&D outside the 
universities. In 1997, 16.3 billion DM were spent by the national government, compared 
to 4.8 billion DM spent by the sixteen federal states (Länder) (BMBF, 1998b, p. 374). 
However, outside their own budgets, the federal states have a number of possibilities to 
participate in national policy-making; 
- secondly, the German R&D system is regarded as highly differentiated. In a 
comparative perspective, the most striking feature is the institutional differentiation of 
strong public research organizations outside the university system responsible for basic 
and applied research (among them the Max-Planck-Society and the Fraunhofer 
Society) which enjoy considerable autonomy from government (see Hohn, Schimank, 
1990); 
- thirdly, despite the existence of a considerable number of public research organizations, 
industry accounts for the major share of R&D in Germany, although its share of R&D 
expenditures has been declining significantly during the 1990s – from 64 per cent in 
1990 to 60.8 per cent in 1996 (BMBF, 1998b, p. 6). In 1997, 61.6 per cent of research 
and development expenditures came from industry. Applied research and experimental 
development are almost exclusively the province of industry; 
- fourthly, the societal sub-systems involved in technology policy, namely science and the 
economy, enjoy a high degree of functional autonomy from the state. According to the 
self-image of the major actors in politics, science and industry, this autonomy is one of 
the preconditions for the efficiency of the German R&D system. This is not to say that 
there are no networks between government and the research community or business. 
Empirical analysis has shown that there is a multitude of formal and informal contacts 
(see Meyer-Krahmer, 1989; Grande, Häusler, 1994). However, it implies that the 
government’s scope for direct, hierarchical intervention is limited. 
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As a consequence of this constellation, German technology policy has been, for most of the 
time, characterized by a feature which has become typical for European technology policy 
too. Rather than establishing and controlling public research laboratories, the state had to 
guide and control private R&D activities without destroying the autonomy of science and 
industry. This means that from the very beginning of a deliberate national technology policy 
in the early 1960s, public authorities had to employ the techniques of an “indirect 
management”, as analyzed by Lax and Sebenius (1986) in the case of industrial companies: 
they had to provide positive incentives for companies, coordinate programs and policies, 
negotiate with research organizations and with companies, etc. Of course, the crucial 
questions then became: Did the German state actually have the capacity to purposefully 
intervene into the R&D activities of industry by these means? Was it possible to promote the 
technological and economic competitiveness of companies? 
The following empirical analysis is based on a sector study of the German IT industry, mainly 
covering data processing, micro-electronics and telecommunications. The IT sector is highly 
instructive for an analysis of state capacity in technology policy since this sector has been 
regarded as being of strategic importance for both military power and the industrial 
competitiveness of every major industrial country. Hence, this sector has been one of the 
major targets of technology policy and one of the most desirable assets in the “technology 
race” between advanced industrial countries (Arnold, Guy, 1986). 
Germany has been no exception. An empirical analysis of the role of the state in the German 
IT sector (see in particular Grande, Häusler, 1994) shows that industrial R&D activities and 
public R&D policies have been closely linked for a long time. Despite the public 
commitments to a free market economy, every government – regardless of its ideological 
profile – has tried to promote industrial research in information technology. Since the late 
1960s, the state has launched numerous programs intended to influence and to stimulate 
companies’ R&D activities or, sometimes, to overcome their reluctance to innovate. All of 
these programs were “obsessed” by the goal to improve the “competitiveness” of the 
“national” industry vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, IBM in particular. For this reason, the 
programs were adressed to the small “club” of “national” companies and were formulated in 
close cooperation with the companies. 
As of 1967, when the first national program for the computer industry started, until 1989, the 
Federal Research Ministry spent about 10 billion DM to promote information technology (i.e. 
data processing, micro-electronics, telecommunications and industrial automation). More 
than half of this money (approximately 5.5 – 6 billion DM) was given directly to the German 
IT industry. Quite obviously, the German state was very active in promoting the IT industry 
with the aim of improving its competitiveness on the domestic market and abroad. But did 
the state actually have the capacity for successful interventions? 
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If one takes the industry’s market performance as an indicator for the policy’s success, the 
German R&D programs promoting the IT industry can hardly be regarded as being 
particularly successful. The number of “national” companies has been very small in the past 
decades anyway. In micro-electronics, the domestic supply mainly came from Siemens and 
AEG; in data processing, in addition to Siemens and AEG, some smaller companies such as 
Nixdorf, Kienzle and Triumph-Adler entered the market in the 1970s. Because of the de facto 
closure of the national telecommunications market, the market position of domestic 
telecommunications companies was stronger, with Siemens being the major supplier of the 
national PTT (the Deutsche Bundespost). 
At the end of the 1990s, Siemens is the only major “German” IT company which has 
survived, and even Siemens has decided to sell its micro-electronics business. Its former 
long-time competitor AEG was taken over by Daimler Benz in the early 1980s, and most of 
its IT activities were either sold or closed. Most of the smaller German IT companies have 
been taken over by foreign companies, for example Mannesmann-Kienzle by DEC and 
Triumph-Adler by Olivetti. Promising new start-ups have been extremely scarce and even the 
most promising ones, like Nixdorf, have been unable to survive. 
Even without a comprehensive evaluation of the IT programs, it is obvious that German IT 
policy has failed to meet most of its goals most of the time. Success stories, like those of the 
Japanese governmental programs in the 1960s and 1970s in the fields of data processing, 
micro-electronics and telecommunications (Anchordogay, 1989; Fransman, 1990), are 
missing completely. This poor record could well be taken as evidence that it is useless in 
principle for the state to intervene in the economy and in the proper working of markets. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes obvious that the organization of the German IT 
industry offered opportunities for purposeful and selective intervention. In principle at least, 
public programs could have (and have!), to some extent, influenced the course and the scale 
of the companies’ research (for telecommunications, see Schnöring, Neu, 1991). However, 
the use of these opportunities has been restricted by various institutional factors both within 
the companies and within the state structure. In fact, empirical studies have shown that very 
particular constellations of factors were responsible for the programs’ limited success. Two 
examples may suffice to illustrate this point (for more details see Grande, Häusler, 1994). 
The first example comes from the field of data processing. In data processing, the German 
government chose a highly ambitious strategy in the 1970s: to make a frontal attack on the 
market leader IBM in the market in which IBM was strongest, which at that time was the 
mainframe business (cf. Flamm, 1988). Such a strategy would have been very demanding 
and risky anywhere; and in the German case it soon turned out to be too much for both the 
companies as well as the state. As far as the state’s role was concerned, the strategy 
chosen would have required at least an effective coordination of R&D programs and of public 
procurement, as emphasized in the literature on successful technology policies (cf. Nelson, 
1982; Lundvall, 1985). Such a comprehensive approach of combining “technology push” 
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programs and “demand pull” policies was already advocated by the German computer 
industry in the mid-1960s and the Federal Research Ministry repeatedly tried to employ this 
approach in its data processing programs. However, for institutional reasons, particularly the 
decentralized structure of the “semi-sovereign” German state and its bureaucracy (cf. 
Katzenstein, 1987), such a coordination came to nothing. As a consequence, the share of 
domestic IT companies (mainly Siemens) receiving government contracts for data 
processing equipment in Germany was well below the respective shares in other countries 
with a national computer industry (France, Japan, the U.S.). In the end, the technology policy 
strategy that emerged within this sector in the 1970s was a plain technology push strategy 
with very limited success. 
The second example comes from the field of telecommunications. At first sight, the 
telecommunications sector seemed to offer much more favorable conditions for national 
technology policy in Germany. In this sector, there was a centralized public agency, the 
Deutsche Bundespost, which enjoyed a full-range monopoly on networks, services and 
equipment, and close, well-established links to a small “club” of domestic equipment 
suppliers. The problem in this case was, that the Deutsche Bundespost, for various 
organizational reasons, turned out to be a rather conservative force and in the late 1970s, 
was blamed for being responsible for the declining international competitiveness of the 
German telecommunications equipment industry. The close links between the Deutsche 
Bundespost and the equipment industry were regarded as a handicap rather than an 
advantage. And because of the strong institutional autonomy of the Deutsche Bundespost 
from direct government intervention, the Federal Research Ministry’s attempts to make the 
PTT more receptive to technological innovations came to nothing. In this constellation, the 
Federal Research Ministry tried to loosen relations between the PTT and the industry by 
offering a R&D program in telecommunications and by advocating the liberalization of the 
telecommunications equipment market. As in data processing, the program’s success has 
been limited, partly because the major industrial players, like Siemens, were reluctant to 
participate, and partly because the PTT failed to efficiently absorb the companies’ growing 
technology potential in its procurement policy. The main beneficiaries of the program were 
Siemens’ smaller competitors, mainly SEL (then an ITT-subsidiary) and AEG, which were 
later taken over by foreign competitors like Alcatel and Philips (and, most of AEG’s 
telecommunications business, by Bosch). 
In both examples, it was not a lack of money or a lack of knowledge on behalf of the state, or 
the companies’ unwillingness to participate in national programs, which were responsible for 
the policy’s disappointing results. Rather, it was a highly contingent constellation of 
institutional factors in each sector which explains most of the programs’ poor performance. 
In the 1980s, German technology policy for the IT sector responded to the obvious 
shortcomings of its programs not by reformulating its goals, but by refining its underlying 
strategy. In the face of intensifying international competition, the Federal Government 
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adopted a comprehensive innovation policy strategy, articulated in two national framework 
programs for information technology, the “Regierungsbericht Informationstechnik”, effective 
as of 1984, and the “Zukunftskonzept Informationstechnik”, enacted in 1989. Both programs 
included a broad range of activities and instruments distributed over a number of policy 
fields. In addition to public R&D subsidies, policy fields such as competition policy, public 
procurement, standardization, data protection, education policy, the modernization of the 
public telecommunications infrastructure, and the liberalization of the national and European 
telecommunications markets, to mention only a few of the most important, would be 
designed in such a way that they would contribute to the international competitiveness of the 
German IT industry. These approaches corresponded very well with theoretical approaches 
which advocate more comprehensive strategies in innovation policy (cf. in particular Porter, 
1990). In the German context, however, these integrated innovation policy approaches were 
over-ambitious and had no chance to be realized. A proper implementation of these 
approaches would have required an intensive “positive” coordination of governmental 
policies; however, in the German system of government – with its high autonomy for each 
Federal Ministry – such an effort was unrealistic (Mayntz, Scharpf, 1975). 
In sum, we can see that German technology policy for the IT sector was confronted with a 
protracted strategic dilemma: Those technology policy strategies which were feasible within 
the existing institutional structures of the German state turned out to be under-complex and, 
thus, inadequate to reach the programs’ goals; however, more adequate, comprehensive 
policy strategies tended to be over-complex, thus overstraining the institutional capability of 
the German state. This innovation policy dilemma has intensified during the 1990s as a 
consequence of the globalization of markets, companies and technologies on the one hand, 
and as a consequence of the Europeanization of technology policy on the other.  
4. The Erosion of State Capacity in German IT  
Policy (I): The Globalization of Markets, Firms  
and Technologies 
At about the same time as the German state started its most ambitious attempt to support 
the “national” IT industry in its intensifying competition with foreign rivals, state capacity in 
technology policy had significantly begun to decline. Meanwhile, plenty of empirical evidence 
illustrates that public interventions in the companies’ R&D activities have become much more 
difficult, if they are still possible at all (cf. Grande, Häusler, 1994; Gerybadze et al., 1997; 
Hack, 1998; Meyer-Krahmer, 1999; OECD, 1999). The first and most important factor 
responsible for the erosion of the state capacity to intervene is the globalization of 
technologies, markets and companies. In the case of IT industry – one of the industrial 
sectors affected most -, globalization has triggered various changes both in the companies’ 
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internal structures and in their external relations. In the context of national technology policy, 
three processes have been of particular importance: 
First, the decentralization of R&D activities: One of the major changes in business R&D has 
been a reorganization of research: “Large firms are pulling back from long-term projects, and 
instead integrating R&D into product development” (OECD, 1999, p. 7). In the IT sector, this 
development has been particularly vivid. Already in the 1980s, IT companies had started to 
reorganize their R&D activities with the goals of exploiting their R&D more effectively, 
speeding up the development of new products, and making R&D departments more 
responsive to customer needs. In practice, this means that they have cut back their central 
R&D laboratories and integrated R&D activities into the various product divisions. A clear 
indication of this development is the decline of basic research in the large German IT 
companies (Siemens, Daimler, Bosch). In 1979, 8.2 per cent of their overall R&D 
expenditures was for basic research; whereas in 1987, only 4.8 per cent was for basic 
research (Grande, Häusler, 1994, p. 374). Meanwhile, in some fields such as 
telecommunications, basic research performed in central research facilities has almost 
disappeared. 
Secondly, the internationalization of R&D activities: The assumption that the companies’ 
R&D activities would be an “important case of Non-Globalization” (Patel, Pavitt, 1991) has by 
and large turned out to be wrong. Recent data from the OECD indicate that the R&D 
activities of multinational corporations “are no longer firmly anchored to their home bases” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 8). In the major OECD countries, foreign subsidiaries already account for 
12 per cent of total industrial R&D spending (OECD, 1999, p. 8). It is true that there are 
significant cross-national and cross-sectoral variations. Whereas U.S. and Japanese 
companies still execute more than 90 per cent of their R&D activities in their home country, 
in smaller countries a considerable share is already abroad. In the Swiss case, for example, 
about 50 per cent of the companies’ R&D is abroad (Boutellier et al., 1996, p. 283). In the 
German case, the foreign subsidiaries of German companies spent about 10 billion DM on 
R&D in 1995, which was about 17 per cent of the companies’ total national R&D 
expenditures; conversely, about 16 per cent of the industry’s R&D expenditure in Germany 
come from the subsidiaries of foreign companies (BMBF, 1998b, p. 7). In information 
technology, the major “national” company, Siemens, is well above this average. The share of 
its foreign R&D employees doubled from 15 per cent in 1985/86 to 30 percent in 1998. In 
1998, Siemens occupied about 14,000 R&D employees abroad, dispersed over 28 countries 
and 56 locations (Weyrich, 1998). 
Thirdly, the integration of R&D activities into global networks of inter-firm cooperations: 
Although cooperation between firms has a long tradition in the IT sector, the 1980s 
witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of joint ventures, strategic alliances and 
R&D co-operations: “From 1980 to 1994, the total number of science and technology 
alliances grew at 10.8 per cent per year, and about 65 per cent of those alliances involved 
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two partners from different countries” (OECD, 1999, p. 13). In the case of German IT 
companies, already in the early 1990s, approximately 90 per cent of the technological 
collaboration efforts involved a foreign partner. Siemens, for example, in 1991/92 was 
involved in about 1,400 cooperative projects; and there were only two German companies 
among the company’s major partners 
As a consequence of all these developments, the target of public R&D policies has been 
fundamentally changing. In contrast to the heyday of national technology policy, when the 
state dealt with a small number of clearly distinct national companies, the target of public 
policy is now an ever-changing, intricate network of “multi-domestic” corporations. This new 
constellation raises several problems for any purposeful political intervention into corporate 
R&D trying to create national competitive advantages. First of all, since it was the central 
R&D laboratories with their long-term, generic research which used to be most receptive to 
public R&D programs, the decentralization of corporate R&D implies that the “window of 
opportunity” for purposeful government intervention into the companies’ R&D activities has 
become much smaller. Moreover, since the distinction between “home” and “host” countries 
has been blurred, any “national technology policy to support specific forms of activities 
becomes increasingly meaningless because there are so many leakages – in both financial 
advantages and research results – to non-national companies” (OECD, 1991, p. 100). 
In principle, there are three strategic options for technology policy to overcome these 
difficulties: first, to adapt its strategic goals to the new constellation; secondly, to develop 
new instruments which are better suited to the new constellation; and thirdly, to adapt the 
institutional architecture of technology policy to the new global context. 
In practice, technology policy has to some extent tried to make use of all these options: “As a 
reaction to the globalisation of the research base, many governments are experimenting with 
new science and technology policy goals and new tools to reach these goals” (OECD, 1999, 
p. 9). German technology policy has been no exception from this general trend. In the course 
of the 1980s, the promotion of basic research, mainly in public research organization, was 
given priority over the public support of corporate R&D. Consequently, the volume of national 
R&D subsidies to industry has been stagnating since 1981, whereas expenditures for public 
research organizations have almost doubled. In the case of Siemens, the share of public 
subsidies to the company’s budget for R&D declined from 10 per cent in 1980 to 2.9 per cent 
in 1990 (Grande, Häusler, 1994, p. 377). In addition, new instruments to promote R&D in 
small and medium-sized companies, and to stimulate technology based start-ups, have been 
employed – to mention only a few of the new programs developed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The institutional architecture of technology policy has also been changing significantly since 
the early 1980s. Partially, at least, as a response to the globalization of technologies, 
markets and companies, new institutional levels of technology policy-making above 
(“Europeanization”) and below (“regionalization”) the nation state have been emerging. 
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5. The Erosion of State Capacity in German IT  
Policy (II): The Europeanization of Technology  
Policy in the IT Sector 
Most important in this respect is the Europeanization of technology policy, which gained new 
momentum in the 1980s. It is true that European cooperation in technology policy was one of 
the earliest examples of supranational integration with the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) founded already in 1957. However, after the crisis of EURATOM in 
the mid-1960s, it rather seemed as if the European countries would cooperate only outside 
the Community framework, if at all. In the aviation sector, bilateral agreements such as the 
Anglo-French Concorde and the Franco-German Airbus have been the predominant mode of 
cooperation; in the space sector, cooperation took place in the framework of international 
organizations such as the European Space Agency (ESA), founded in 1975. Attempts at 
European cooperation within the Community framework in data processing (Eurodata, 
Unidata) and in micro-electronics, initiated in the late 1960s and 1970s, failed completely (cf. 
Sharp, Shearman, 1987, pp. 24–41). 
In the 1980s, however, economic and technological changes radically transformed the 
perceptions about technological and industrial competitiveness in Europe and about the 
need for collaborative efforts on the European level (Peterson, 1993; Sandholtz, 1992; 
Sharp, Shearman, 1987; Peterson, Sharp, 1999). The dramatic decline of European 
industries in strategic sectors such as micro-electronics and data processing, U.S. 
predominance on globalizing markets, and the rise of Japan as a technological power 
combined to trigger a new “technology gap” debate, thus creating a favorable climate for a 
“common European response”. Compared to the frustrating national efforts (see e.g. 
Cawson et al., 1990), a common European response was expected to offer several 
advantages. It would help to overcome the fragmentation of national resources and 
programs, and it would offer a common cooperation platform for the European companies. In 
brief, by transferring competencies and resources from the national to the supranational 
level, both the scope and the scale of technology policy would be expanded, and the growing 
gap between globalizing markets and national policies would be bridged. 
Based on this rationale, the European Community became a major player in technology 
policy in the 1980s. With the adoption of the “First Framework Programme” in the summer of 
1983, a fundamental strategic reorientation of the Community’s science and technology 
policy was introduced. A new emphasis was given to activities designed to improve the 
competitiveness of European industry, and a new generation of sectoral programs was 
initiated, targeted at a number of high-tech industries whose competitiveness was expected 
to be crucial for the industrial development of Europe. In the following years, the EC 
established a very comprehensive framework of programs aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of European industry. 
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In addition to research funding, the European Community (resp. Union) has acquired 
competencies in a multitude of areas, which are of importance for the regulation of 
technological developments and the improvement of industrial competitiveness. When it 
comes to such issues as the establishment of guidelines for environmental protection, the 
regulation of genetic engineering, the liberalization of the telecommunications markets or 
data protection, agreement on technical norms and standards, or the approval of corporate 
mergers, the EU has become a crucial actor, in some areas even the most important actor. 
And by strictly monitoring R&D funding in the member states on the basis of its 
competencies in competition policy, the Community has, for quite some time now, restricted 
their capacity to act in the area of technology policy. 
The sector that has gained most attention in the Community’s new strategy has been 
information technology. ESPRIT, the Community’s new program for the promotion of R&D in 
the information technology industry, prepared in the early 1980s, became the “flagship” of 
the Community’s technology policy (Sandholtz, 1992; Grande, Häusler, 1994; Peterson, 
Sharp, 1999). Other programs based on the “ESPRIT model” in telecommunications 
(RACE), and on the use of telematics in various sectors of society (transport, medicine etc.) 
were swift to follow. In its first four “Framework Programmes”, the Community spent about 9 
billion ECU on its various IT programs. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, about 40 per 
cent of the Community’s research budget was devoted to information technology. In the fifth 
“Framework Programme”, which started in 1999, 24 per cent will be spent in the field of 
information technology, i.e. 3.6 billion ECU (BMBF, 1998a, p. 25). 
In the 1980s, the main target of the respective programs were the big IT companies in the 
EC member states (GEC, Philips, Siemens, Thompson etc.). In the heyday of the ESPRIT 
program, the European IT companies received more than half of their public R&D subsidies 
from Community programs. It is true, however, that these subsidies were only a small share 
of the companies’ overall R&D budget anyway. In the case of Siemens, for example, only 2 
per cent of the company’s research is currently financed by public funding. This should not 
be taken as an indicator, however, that public R&D subsidies have become irrelevant for the 
large, globally-operating companies. A closer look reveals that these subsidies can still be 
highly significant. For example, in the early 1990s, 20 to 30 per cent of the European IT 
companies’ long-term generic research was conducted within the various EC programs. 
Despite all these programs and activities, the Community’s technology policy has not been 
particularly successful either – if success is measured by the policy’s contribution to the 
competitiveness of the European IT industry (Peterson, Sharp, 1999, pp. 205–207). It is true 
that the programs have contributed to intensifing cooperation between European 
researchers and research institutes in Europe. However,  the European companies have 
failed to gain significant shares of the IT world market. At the end of the 1990s, the industry’s 
international market position was still feeble. In 1995, after ten years of massive Community 
support for the European IT industry, the Commission had to concede that “over the last 
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fifteen years its (i.e. the EU’s; EG) technological and commercial performance in high-
technology sectors such as electronics and information technologies has deteriorated” 
(European Commission, 1995, p. 5). 
There are many reasons for the disappointing performance of the Community’s IT programs. 
First of all, it soon became obvious that European programs were unable to overrule the 
global logic of markets, companies and technologies. Initial hopes that the companies would 
prefer to cooperate within Europe and compete outside Europe turned out to be illusionary. 
In the 1990s, the companies adopted complex strategies with a mix of national, European 
and global partnerships and rivalries. In micro-electronics, for example, ideas to establish a 
“European” chip factory with the help of Community funding were not only at odds with the 
Community’s competition policy, but also with the companies’ global strategies. Siemens, 
one of the prime targets of plans like these, not only participated in the various national and 
European programs available, but also cooperated with U.S. (IBM, Motorola) and Japanese 
(Toshiba) competitors in the development and production of advanced semiconductors. 
In addition, Community R&D programs in IT initially suffered from a considerable strategic 
deficiency. Programs such as ESPRIT, BRITE and EURAM were designed purely as 
“technology push” programs. The aim of these programs was to produce a “technology push” 
which was expected to lead to a substantial improvement in the industrial competitiveness of 
the EC. Similar to the German IT programs of the 1970s and 1980s, the effectiveness of 
such “technology push” programs was very limited. For example, the most in-depth 
evaluation of the ESPRIT program concluded that ”In particular the industry led, technology 
push, approach of ESPRIT, whilst demonstrably capable of producing good results, is not 
achieving the lift in European competitiveness which is now called for” (Dekker Report, 1992, 
p. 33). 
By the end of the 1980s, the European Commission began to realize the shortcomings of its 
technology policy and started developing a more comprehensive innovation policy approach, 
similar to German technology policy a decade ago. Inspired by Michael Porter’s seminal 
work on the “Competitiveness of Nations” (Porter, 1990), which was to become the new holy 
book for the Commission’s technology policy, the Community modified its strategy in this 
policy field. The new strategy was based on the assumption that the existing problems of 
competitiveness in European industry are caused not so much by technology “gaps” or lack 
of funds for research, but rather by severe deficiencies in the diffusion and application of 
generally well-known technologies and their integration into complex technical systems. The 
European Commission repeatedly emphasized “that the main problem of European firms is 
not primarily the amount of their R&D expenditures, but rather their inadequate ability to turn 
their research and technology developments into inventions and to turn their inventions into 
market shares and profits”. The result, as the Commission concluded, is “a distinct gap 
between Europe’s efforts in basis research and R&D investments on the one hand and the 
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results in the area of innovation and competitiveness on the other” (European Commission, 
1992, p. 10). 
This problem, called the “European paradox” (European Commission 1995: 5; see also 
Andreasen et al. 1995), was addressed in several expert reports to the Commission (e.g. the 
Ciampi report; Consultative Group on Competitiveness, 1995), and in various White and 
Green Papers presented by the Commission in the 1990s on industrial, economic and 
innovation policy (European Commission, 1990; 1993; 1995). In its White Paper on industrial 
policy, for example, R&D policy (as an “accelerator”) was integrated in a comprehensive 
framework including competition policy, education policy, cohesion policy, environmental 
policy, trade policy and policies for small and medium-sized companies (European 
Commission, 1990). In its Green Paper on Innovation, the Commission stated: 
“Strengthening the capacity for innovation involves various policies: industrial policy, RTD 
policy, education and training, tax policy, competition policy, regional policy and policy on 
support for SMEs, environment policy, etc. Ways must therefore be found of identifying, 
preparing and implementing – in a coordinated fashion – the necessary measures covered 
by these various policies” (European Commission, 1995, p. 3). 
The experiences of German IT policy in the 1980s would suggest that the major problem is 
not the identification of policies, rather, it is their coordinated preparation and 
implementation. And the crucial question, in fact, is whether European policies are able to 
overcome the deficiencies of national policies in this respect. Empirical analyses of 
European technology policy confirm this assumption (Grande, 1994; 1995). The EU’s 
political and administrative structures are to a limited extent only, able to meet the demands 
placed on an integrated innovation policy at the Community level. It is common knowledge 
that the decision making process is protracted, that its results often consist of unsatisfactory 
compromises and that the administrative implementation of decisions is cumbersome. 
However, it would be wrong to only blame the European Commission for these institutional 
deficiencies. The core of the institutional problems of European technology policy is the fact 
that policy must be developed and implemented in a multi-level framework of governance 
with complicated interactions among national and European actors and institutions (Grande, 
1999). In this institutional context, the representatives of the national research 
administrations play a key role in the European decision-making process. Due to the 
unstable balance of power between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament on the 
one hand, and between the EU and its member states on the other, these processes are 
usually extremely complicated and correspondingly lengthy, insofar as they are formalized at 
all. 
In such an institutional framework, a high degree of consensus on the goals and priorities of 
European technology policy among the participants of negotiation processes would be 
necessary in order to make quick and appropriate decisions. In the previous two decades, 
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this has not been the case. The negotiations concerning the Community’s “Framework 
Programmes” and its numerous “specific” programs have shown that there are not only 
multi-faceted cultural differences among the EU member states, but also a number of 
fundamental conflicts of interest, be they motivated by economic, regional or socio-political 
reasons (cf. Grande, 1995). As a result, programs “turn out to be shopping lists of national 
priorities, often with low coherence and little European value added”, as, for example, the 
Davignon Panel concluded in its 5-year assessment of the EU’s “Fourth Framework 
Programme” (Davignon Panel, 1997, p. 14). In the actual practice of funding, a complicated 
mix of political selection criteria, such as the “adequate” participation of small and medium-
sized companies, the “just” return of funds to the member states or the “adequate” 
participation of economically less-developed member states, has always had to be taken into 
consideration – in addition to criteria of excellence. As a result, the programs’ strategic 
coherence has been rather low.  
In addition to these political and institutional deficiencies of the European policy process, the 
organization of competencies for technology policy in the European Commission is also ill-
suited to implement an integrated policy strategy. Within the Commission, competencies are 
highly fragmented and the available coordination mechanisms available are weak. The 
administration of the research programs is divided among numerous offices and in the 
1990s, even in information technology, two Directorates General (DG III and DG XIII) were 
responsible for the respective programs. The same is true for other domains vital to 
technology policy (e.g. transportation, telecommunications). In the past, the organization of 
offices was often governed by short-term political expediency rather than sound, task-
oriented planning. In such an organizational setting, a close policy coordination would be 
particularly important. However, policy coordination within the Commission in general is said 
to be weak, and in the field of technology policy, it has clearly been inadequate (Agrain et al., 
1989). By the end of the 1990s, John Peterson and Margaret Sharp arrive at the 
disillusioning conclusion that “It is difficult to see where RTD policy has been coordinated 
effectively with other EU policies – such as energy, transport, agriculture, the environment, or 
industry – despite the vastly increased importance of science and technology in all these 
sectors” (Sharp, Peterson, 1999, p. 221). Inter-Commission rivalries have been frequent, and 
rather than weakening, they even “appeared to be intensifying” (Peterson, Sharp, 1999, p. 
218); and the Task Forces established in the mid-1990s, with the goal of improving policy 
coordination within the Commission, have been failing. The overall result has been a 
fragmented assessment of problems and an incremental development of programs – 
sometimes even working at cross-purposes, rather than an integrated policy approach. 
Hence, there are good reasons why recent studies of European technology policy “stress the 
need for greater co-ordination of the various policies not only at the sectoral but also on the 
transnational level in order to better face the challenges of globalization. Stress laid on the 
co-ordination of the research, innovation and education policies supports the efforts of the 
European policy in these sectors which could find increased effectiveness if a similar 
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approach were followed in the Member States” (Lundvall, Borras, 1998, p. 3). However, 
there is no basis for the assumption that the EU is better equipped to cope with the problem 
of horizontal and vertical policy coordination than was Germany with its technology policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
At the end of the 1990s, it seems as if European technology policy has hit the same dead-
end as German technology policy in the decades before. This is not to deny the theoretical 
plausibility and the heuristic value of an integrated innovation policy approach. But empirical 
evidence seems to indicate that the political and institutional preconditions for the coherent 
formulation and proper implementation of such an approach are unrealistic. As long as this 
coordination problem has not been solved, the Europeanization of technology policy only 
adds to the political and institutional complexity of technology policy-making without 
increasing the problem-solving capacity of the state. Hence, the European policy making 
process is confronted with the same innovation policy dilemma as that of Germany. 
6. Conclusions: Towards a New Paradigm in 
European Technology Policy? 
During the last two decades, technology policy in Europe has been characterized by two 
developments running in opposite directions. On the one hand, the concepts and strategies 
guiding public R&D policies have become more and more complex, resulting in 
encompassing programs for national and European „innovation policies”. On the other hand, 
as a result of the globalization of technologies, markets and companies, and of changes in 
the internal structure of the state, the state’s capability to successfully implement these 
ambitious strategies have been eroding. As a consequence, public R&D policy both on the 
national and on the supranational level has been confronted with an intensifying strategic 
dilemma: Policy strategies which have been feasible within the existing institutional 
structures turned out to be under-complex and, hence, inadequate to improve industrial 
competitiveness in the IT sector; however, more adequate, comprehensive innovation policy 
strategies tended to be over-complex and overstrained the state’s institutional capability, in 
particular its capacity for horizontal and vertical policy coordination. 
This has been one of the main reasons why the performance of the “competition state” 
(Peterson, 1993) in Europe has been rather disappointing in the past decades. Hitherto, 
national and European technology policy has responded to the problem of policy failure by 
designing even more ambitious, more comprehensive and better integrated programs and by 
tightening the networks between public authorities, companies and research organizations 
even more skillfully. The Commission’s recent proposal for a “European research area” 
based on a “more co-ordinated implementation of national and European research 
programmes” is another example of such efforts (European Commission, 2000). If the 
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argument developed in this article holds true, these efforts would be futile. However, this 
does not imply that technology policy on a supranational level is useless or that it is 
impossible for the EU to pursue an ambitious strategic approach in this field. Rather, the 
argument implies that the deliberate strategies based on a full-scale “steering” of public 
policies and industrial activities are unsuited for a highly fragmented and decentralized 
institutional setting as exists both in Germany and in the EU. 
The crucial question then, is whether or not there are possibilities to improve the 
performance of EU technology policy. In principle, there are at least three options which 
provide a way out of the innovation policy dilemma outlined above without giving up the 
substance of the policy’s goals. The first option would be to concentrate and to centralize the 
institutional setting, the second one would be to decentralize the policy, and the third would 
be to adopt a policy strategy which is better suited to the institutional framework of the EU. 
The first option, a stronger concentration and centralization of competencies and resources 
in innovation policy, is the most obvious solution to the coordination problems within the EU. 
The use of “hierarchy” as an organizing principle to cope with complexity is well known in 
organization theory (Simon 1962), and in fact, this was the strategy pursued in German 
technology policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Within the national government, competencies 
were concentrated within a single ministry (Stucke 1993), and at the same time, the 
importance of the federal states in technology policy declined. However, the German 
example has also given some indications of the limits of such a strategy. The limits of any 
concentration of resources and competencies are reached as soon as the genuine 
competencies of other major ministries are touched, for example the legal competencies of 
the Ministry of Finance in tax policy. In addition, both in federal states like Germany and in 
the EU, there are strict constitutional (respectively contractual) limits to a full-scale 
centralization of resources and competencies. Hence, in practice a stronger concentration 
and centralization of competencies in European innovation policy is not realistic. 
The second option to cope with the European innovation policy dilemma, a decentralization 
of technology policy, seems to be more promising. Such a strategy, as advocated for 
example by John Peterson and Margaret Sharp (1999, 232–233), is supported by the 
experiences of EU activities financed by the structural funds on the regional level and, most 
of all, by the success of regional innovation policies in high-technology industries such as IT 
and biotechnology (Braczyk, Cooke, Heidenreich, 1998; Braczyk, Fuchs, Wolf, 1999). These 
examples seem to indicate that the institutional framework of innovation policies on the local 
and regional level is less complex, and, moreover, that local and regional governments – 
because of the proximity of actors – are better equipped with “soft”, trust-based instruments 
of political intervention. 
Hence, there are good reasons to argue that the most promising measures of technology 
policy “are best designed and delivered at the regional or even subregional level of 
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government. What are needed from Brussels are programmes that provide a catalyst but, as 
with the structural funds, essentially promote such action at lower levels of government” 
(Peterson, Sharp, 1999, p. 233). There is no need to deny the benefits of regional innovation 
policies in many instances, but there are some doubts that they actually allow to escape from 
the innovation policy dilemma as described for national and supranational policies. First of 
all, at the regional and local level, there is an extreme heterogeneity of institutions which 
make for considerable variation in the effectiveness of policy implementation. For this 
reason, proposals advocating a decentralization and regionalization of innovation policies 
are inevitably faced with the problem how the multitude of activities on the various levels can 
be integrated into a coherent strategic framework. 
The third option tries to solve the European innovation policy dilemma by adopting a policy 
strategy which is better suited to the EU’s fragmented and decentralized institutional 
framework. The key to such a strategy could be a distinction introduced in organization 
theory by Hugh Mintzberg and Alexandra McHugh (1985). They distinguish between 
“deliberate strategies” on the one hand, i.e. plans intentionally designed and implemented, 
and what they call “emergent strategies”, i.e. an “unintended order” emerging from the 
uncoordinated activities of individual actors or organizations that nevertheless can be both 
rational and socially acceptable. “Strategy” in the latter case is not defined with respect to 
intentions, but with respect to realization. Whereas deliberate strategies emphasize the 
implementation of pre-given goals, emergent strategies emphasize processes and results: 
Emergent strategies “are the product of a process. In the course of this process, the 
individual or collective aims and interests of the participants in a widespread debate are 
generated, formulated and transformed. The final, composite result of these independent 
efforts may be said to be rational” (Fach, Grande, 1992, p. 17). Emergent strategies must not 
be confused with a neo-liberal market model or with a laissez-faire approach. They can well 
very be the object of purposeful political action. However, strategy formation follows a 
different logic and employs different instruments. 
Most important for the purpose of this article, these different approaches can be related to 
different organizational settings. Deliberate strategies are best suited to ideal-type 
hierarchies, whereas emergent strategies are better suited to organizations with distributed 
power or “adhocracies”. Quite obviously, the EU, with its multi-level system of governance 
and its complicated mix of interests, comes closer to the latter type than to the former. 
Against this background, the fundamental failure of European technology policy was that it 
employed a strategic approach which did not fit the basic characteristics of its institutional 
framework. And this would imply that EU policy-making, if possible, should employ a “grass-
root model” of strategy formation as suggested by Mintzberg and McHugh and some kind of 
emergent strategy rather than deliberate ones. 
This is not the proper place to develop such a “grass-root model” for European technology 
policy in full detail. Rather, I will outline a few basic elements which seem to be characteristic 
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of an emergent strategy in European technology policy. The common rationale of all these 
activities would be to stimulate, intensify, promote and guide the self-coordination of 
independent actors and organizations in order to make European technology policy a joint 
effort, instead of relying on purposeful policy-coordination by a supranational institution. Key 
elements of an emergent strategy in technology policy could be: (i) forecasting, (ii) 
frameworking, (iii) activating and mediating, and (iv) financing. 
i. Forecasting: Forecasting exercises have become an important element of any 
technology policy approach (Cuhls, 1998). For an approach relying on the emergent 
results of uncoordinated and uncontrolled individual activities by companies and public 
research institutes, the identification of long-term problems and opportunities, and the 
formulation of long-term tasks for research and policy-making, systematic forecasting 
is essential. However, in such an approach the results of forecasting exercises are not 
interpreted as being “substantive” knowledge for deliberative policy making. Rather, 
they are used as cognitive maps and guidelines for open public debates. The final 
result should not be unanimous decisions, but common visions guiding the 
independent activities of politicians, civil servants, researchers and citizens. 
ii. Frameworking: In an emergent policy strategy, it is more important to provide an 
appropriate institutional and organizational framework for (individual, organizational 
and collective) learning, both in politics and in economics, than it is to make a definite 
decision, once and for all. As Bengt-Ake Lundvall and Susana Borrás (1998, p. 35) 
have rightly emphasized, in a context of increased market competition and rapid 
innovation, it is the capacity to learn which is of crucial importance for companies. And 
the same holds true for policies. What makes a political strategy brilliant in such a 
context is not foresight and decision-making power, “but a capacity and willingness to 
learn, supported by a tolerant organization and its committed personnel” (Mintzberg, 
McHugh, 1985, p. 194). Thus, it would be a major function of an emergent strategy in 
technology policy to establish the framework for a “learning” economy and society. 
iii. Activating and mediating: In an emergent policy strategy, the public’s active 
participation in the design and use of technical systems is crucial. In such a strategy, 
interested citizens are not forced into the role of mere consumers; instead, their 
practical experiences, imagination and creativity are used in the development of 
socially acceptable new technologies. Hence, it must be an integral part of an 
emergent strategy in technology policy to promote and cultivate democratic 
participation in technology policy making. 
 This includes the organization of an efficient public mediation process, in which the 
different interests that have been articulated are aggregated and reconciled. In national 
research systems, this is the function of intermediary institutions. In the Dutch research 
system, for example, “the intermediary layer is densely populated, and there are many 
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network links between the institutions, committees, councils, programming bodies, etc. 
Horizontal co-ordination occurs easily” (Van der Meulen, Rip, 1998, p. 758). In the case 
of the EU, this intermediary layer is clearly underdeveloped (Grande, Peschke, 1999a; 
1999b). Although there are a host of national and transnational organizations active in 
European R&D policy, horizontal links are weak and the inter-organizational networks 
are fragmented. Hence, the establishment of intermediary institutions and the 
promotion of inter-organizational networks must be an important part of an emergent 
policy strategy in the EU. 
iv.  Financing: Money matters and public research funding on both a national and a 
supranational level must also be part of an emergent strategy in technology policy. 
Rather, it is the basic philosophy of funding which distinguishes the different strategies. 
Whereas deliberate strategies in recent years have been based on an ever tighter 
coupling of basic research and socio-economic objectives, an emergent strategy 
emphasizes the open-ended character of basic research instead. As Barend van der 
Meulen and Arie Rip have recently argued, “Research results need not have an 
unambiguous link with socio-economic objectives. Their results are useful in the sense 
that these become part of a knowledge reservoir, and, thus, building blocks for ‘new 
combinations’ that are formed with specific socio-economic objectives in mind”. And as 
a consequence, “The way (research; EG) results become part of the reservoir, and the 
access to the reservoir (including knowledge structuring efforts) may well be more 
important than the fine-tuning of research projects to socio-economic objectives” (van 
der Meulen, Rip, 1998, p. 767). 
This last aspect indicates best, that a shift to a new, emergent strategy in EU technology 
policy does not require completely new instruments, additional resources or new 
competencies. Rather, it implies a new paradigm, i.e. a new way of looking at problems, of 
selecting policy instruments and of using them. Most importantly, in an emergent strategy, 
solutions to problems grow “like weeds in the garden; they are not cultivated like tomatoes in 
a hothouse” (Mintzberg, McHugh, 1985, p. 194). Admittedly, compared to the “hothouse” 
approaches with their high ambitions and their big promises as employed in EU technology 
policy during the last two decades, a “gardening” approach as advocated here seems to be 
much more modest and much less appealing. However, it also seems to be the most 
promising way for Europe to escape the existing strategic dilemma in innovation policy. 
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providing inspiring comments to the first draft of this manuscript, in particular to Peter 
Biegelbauer, Hans Klein, Stefan Kuhlmann and Philip Shapira. Furthermore, he appreciates 
the assistance of Sarah E. Fritz in the preparation of the manuscript. 
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